Device and method for detecting a manipulation of an information signal

ABSTRACT

The present invention relates to a device for detecting a manipulation of an information signal, having an extractor for extracting an information signal component characteristic for the information signal from the information signal, an encryptor for encrypting the information signal component to obtain an encrypted signal, and a comparator for comparing the encrypted signal to a reference signal, wherein the reference signal is an encrypted representation of a non-manipulated reference signal component of a reference information signal to detect the manipulation.

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application is a continuation of co-pending InternationalApplication No. PCT/EP2005/012114, filed Nov. 11, 2005, which designatedthe United States and was not published in English.

TECHNICAL FIELD

The present invention relates to checking the integrity of informationsignals.

BACKGROUND

With an ongoing spreading of modern communication media, the importanceof concepts protecting information signals from unauthorizedmanipulation and/or revealing a manipulation is increasing.

When the information signals are, for example, digital audio or videosignals, so-called watermarks are often employed to provide the datawith, for example, copy protection. The watermarks are, for example,“woven” into the information signal such that removing the watermark,for example for eliminating the copy protection, inevitably leavesdigital traces which may be detected. In order to prevent reproductionof the data, even in the case of a successful removal of the watermark,it is also necessary to check the data for integrity to recognize apotential manipulation.

Well-known approaches for an integrity check of information signals arebased on encrypting the entire data by a cryptographic hash process. Thecryptographic hash values are often referred to as a check sum. They arecalculated from an input value of unknown length and unambiguouslydefine a certain output value, the so-called hash (such as, for example,a string of 20 bytes). Here, the characteristic feature of the hashfunction is to determine, for any input value, an unambiguouslyassociated output value from which the input value cannot be derived.

The complete amount of data is at first processed by the hash algorithm,i.e. the hash of the amount of data is formed. For a subsequentintegrity check, the amount of data to be tested is again processedcompletely by the hash algorithm. If this results in the same hash as inthe reference pass, it may be assumed that no changes have been made tothe dataset.

The requirements to hash functions may basically be expressed in threepoints:

-   -   Every hash value must be present in an equal amount of times,        i.e. the probability of hash values for different input values        must not differ.    -   A change of the input value should result in a changed hash        value.    -   The complexity of generating collisions should be very high,        i.e. it should be as difficult as possible to find, for a        certain input value, a second input value having the same hash        value.

A hash function fulfilling all three requirements is also referred to asa cryptographic hash function. SHA-1, MD4, MD5 and RIPE-MD160 are amongthe most important hash functions.

The cryptographic hash function SHA-1 processes blocks of a length of512 bits and thus generates 160-bit hash values. 532-bit variables(chain variables) as well as the so-called compression function play animportant role.

At first, the input value is divided into blocks of a length of 512bits. Subsequently, the compression function takes the five chainvariables and a 512-bit block and maps this to the next 532-bit values.The function runs in four rounds, each having 20 identical operationswhere the individual bits are shifted according to predefinedcalculating operations. Finally, the content of the five chain variablesis output as the hash value. The usage of hash processes for anintegrity check is, for example, described in Open Mobile Alliance, OMADRM Specification V2.0, Draft Version 2.0-Apr. 10, 2004.

It is of disadvantage in the known approaches that, as a standard, acomplete dataset, i.e. the entire information signal, is tested, whichentails high complexity. Additionally, changes in the dataset cannot bemade at a later point, such as, for example, adding one or severalwatermarks, without destroying the integrity of the dataset, even ifonly certain dataset components are changed.

SUMMARY

According to an embodiment, a device for detecting a manipulation of aninformation signal, wherein the information signal includes aninformation signal component with side information and a furtherinformation signal component with main information, the side informationbeing linked to the main information, may have: an extractor forextracting the information signal component with side information andcharacteristic for the information signal from the information signal;an encryptor for encrypting the extracted information signal componentwith side information to acquire an encrypted signal; and a comparatorfor comparing the encrypted signal to a reference signal, the referencesignal being an encrypted representation of a non-manipulated referencesignal component with side information of a reference information signalto detect the manipulation.

According to another embodiment, a device for detecting a manipulationof an information signal may have: an extractor for extracting aninformation signal component characteristic for the information signalfrom the information signal; a decryptor for decrypting a referencesignal, the reference signal being an encrypted representation of anon-manipulated reference signal component of a reference informationsignal to acquire a decrypted signal; and a comparator for comparing thedecrypted signal to the information signal component to detect themanipulation of the information signal.

According to another embodiment, a device for generating an informationsignal from an input signal, the input signal including an input signalcomponent and a further input signal component, the further input signalcomponent including main information, and the input signal componentincluding side information linked to the main information, may have: anencryptor for encrypting the input signal component to acquire areference signal; and an assembler for assembling the input signalcomponent, the further input signal component and the reference signalto generate the information signal.

According to another embodiment, a method for detecting a manipulationof an information signal, wherein the information signal includes aninformation signal component with side information and a furtherinformation signal component with main information, the side informationbeing linked to the main information, may have the steps of: extractingthe information signal component with side information andcharacteristic for the information signal from the information signal;encrypting the extracted information signal component with sideinformation to acquire an encrypted signal; and comparing the encryptedsignal to a reference signal, the reference signal being an encryptedrepresentation of a non-manipulated reference signal component with sideinformation of a reference information signal to detect themanipulation.

According to another embodiment, a method for detecting a manipulationof an information signal may have the steps of: extracting aninformation signal component characteristic for the information signalfrom the information signal; decrypting a reference signal, thereference signal being an encrypted representation of a non-manipulatedreference signal component of a reference information signal to acquirea decrypted signal; and comparing the decrypted signal to theinformation signal component to detect the manipulation.

According to another embodiment, a method for generating an informationsignal from an input signal, the input signal including an input signalcomponent and a further input signal component, the further input signalcomponent including main information, and the input signal componentincluding side information linked to the main information, may have thesteps of: encrypting the input signal component to acquire a referencesignal; and assembling the input signal component, the further inputsignal component and the reference signal to generate the informationsignal.

According to another embodiment, a computer program may perform, whenthe computer program runs on a computer, a method for detecting amanipulation of an information signal, wherein the information signalincludes an information signal component with side information and afurther information signal component with main information, the sideinformation being linked to the main information, the method having thesteps of: extracting the information signal component with sideinformation and characteristic for the information signal from theinformation signal; encrypting the extracted information signalcomponent with side information to acquire an encrypted signal; andcomparing the encrypted signal to a reference signal, the referencesignal being an encrypted representation of a non-manipulated referencesignal component with side information of a reference information signalto detect the manipulation.

According to another embodiment, a computer program may perform, whenthe computer program runs on a computer, a method for detecting amanipulation of an information signal, the method having the steps of:extracting an information signal component characteristic for theinformation signal from the information signal; decrypting a referencesignal, the reference signal being an encrypted representation of anon-manipulated reference signal component of a reference informationsignal to acquire a decrypted signal; and comparing the decrypted signalto the information signal component to detect the manipulation.

According to another embodiment, a computer program may perform, whenthe computer program runs on a computer, a method for generating aninformation signal from an input signal, the input signal including aninput signal component and a further input signal component, the furtherinput signal component including main information, and the input signalcomponent including side information linked to the main information, themethod having the steps of: encrypting the input signal component toacquire a reference signal; and assembling the input signal component,the further input signal component and the reference signal to generatethe information signal.

The invention is based on the finding that a plurality of informationsignals connected to different applications, such as, for example, videoor audio signals, comprise information characteristic for theinformation signal, which may be used for protecting a dataset againstmanipulation, simultaneously allowing non-characteristic changes in thedataset.

When the information signal is, for example, an MP3-coded file, the fileshould, while checking the MP3-coded audio file for integrity, such as,for example, to be able to reveal manipulations, be recognized as beingunchanged when, for example, a watermark has been added by means ofbitstream watermarking. Manipulations on the file changing thecharacteristic of the piece or even resulting in the piece (or parts ofit) having to be replaced, should be recognized unambiguously. Accordingto the present invention, in order to allow for example watermarks to beadded at a later point in time, information which is characteristic andinherent for the information signal, in this example of the MP3-codedaudio file, is used as a sensor.

At first, the characteristic information of a dataset, i.e. of aninformation signal, must be established. This step may be defineddepending on the type and application of the dataset and, in thesimplest case, necessitates masking out non-characteristic parts,perhaps filtering or transforming the dataset, in order to obtain thecharacteristic information. In an MP3-coded piece of music, it is, forexample, sufficient to extract the side information or only a part ofthe side information, without considering spectral data forming the maininformation, wherein the side information is linked to the maininformation and, for example, includes scaling factors for the spectraldata. If a watermark is, for example, added to the spectral data, thiswill not change the characteristic information. The integrity of theinformation signal is, in the inventive meaning, not affected.

In a second step, the integrity of exclusively characteristicinformation is protected and/or tested by a cryptographic method,wherein the hash process already mentioned may exemplarily be used forthe cryptographic method.

With the example of the MP3 datastream, the scaling factors linked tothe spectral data may, for example, be utilized as characteristicinformation such that the hash method is, for example, only applied tothe scaling factors, i.e. the hash value is only calculated on thescaling factors. If bitstream watermarking is applied, the spectralvalues will change, but not so the scaling factors (scaling parameters).A later check of the hash will therefore provide matching, in the casethat there has been no manipulation of the dataset (of the informationsignal). This is, for example, sufficient to prevent another piece to beused instead.

In contrast to the conventional art, where an integrity check of theentire file is performed by a cryptographic hash method withoutconsidering characteristic information, the present invention is basedon protecting a dataset against manipulating its characteristicinformation, simultaneously allowing non-characteristic changes in thedataset.

A cryptographic hash method, such as, for example, SHA-1, mayexemplarily be used for an integrity check of a dataset. It serves tocheck a one-to-one matching between a reference (original) and a datasetto be compared (copy). The result of this check is either “identical” or“deviation of some kind”.

As has already been mentioned, it is sometimes desired to allow specificchanges in a dataset, such as, for example, by adding a watermark, andnevertheless to be able to check for the characteristic information tobe present in an unchanged form, i.e. that it is essentially still theoriginal dataset, i.e. the original non-manipulated dataset. Accordingto the invention, the characteristic information of a dataset is checkedfor integrity. “Characteristic information” may be defined according tothe case of application. An example of this is an MP3-coded piece ofmusic to which, as has been described above, a watermark is to be addedby means of bitstream watermarking after determining the integrityinformation. The spectral values of the piece will change (slightly),the scaling factors and other side information, however, remain the sameand differentiate the piece from other pieces of music. Thecharacteristic information is thus retained.

According to the invention, an MP3-coded piece of music can still berecognized as being unchanged when it has been treated by bitstreamwatermarking. The integrity of characteristic information of a datasetis checked, changes in the dataset not changing the characteristicinformation, however, are allowed.

In MP3-coded pieces of music, the integrity of characteristicinformation signal parts including the characteristic information is notdisturbed by using bitstream watermarking. Thus, it can be achieved thatthe original cannot be replaced by another piece or parts of anotherpiece, which is, for example, important for DRM applications, whereinnon-characteristic information may nevertheless be changed.

By means of the possibility of being able to test characteristicinformation of a dataset specifically for integrity, non-characteristicinformation may be changed without changing the integrity. In the caseof an MP3-coded file, for example, a watermark may be added by means ofbitstream watermarking without changing the integrity of the file in theinventive meaning, i.e., for example, without the inventive hash methodto report a deviation from the original.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWING

Embodiments of the present invention will be detailed subsequentlyreferring to the appended drawing, in which:

FIG. 1 is a block circuit diagram of a device for detecting amanipulation of an information signal according to an embodiment of thepresent invention.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

The device illustrated in FIG. 1 includes means 101 for extracting, theoutput of which is coupled to an input of means 103 for encrypting.Means 103 for encrypting includes an output coupled to an input of means105 for comparing.

As is illustrated in FIG. 1, the information signal includes aninformation signal component characteristic for the information signal.The means 101 for extracting is configured to extract the informationsignal component and to make available the information signal componentto the means 103 for encrypting. The means 103 for encrypting isconfigured to encrypt the information component, for example using acryptographic method, to obtain an encrypted signal.

The means 105 for comparing is configured to receive the encryptedsignal from the means 103 for encrypting and to compare the encryptedsignal to a reference signal, the reference signal being an encryptedrepresentation of a non-manipulated reference signal component of areference information signal to detect the manipulation of theinformation signal in case the information signal has been manipulated.

In the case of a detected manipulation, the means 105 for comparing mayprovide, via an output, a control signal indicating a manipulation ofthe information signal at an input of the means 101 for extracting.

Inventively, the means 101 for extracting may be configured not tofilter out a further information signal component or further informationsignal components of the information signal such that a change of thefurther information components cannot be detected. If, for example, awatermark is to be added to the other components of the informationsignal, this change of the information signal should, according to theinvention, not result in a manipulation to be detected because allowedchanges of the dataset should not be detectable according to theinvention, in order not to disturb the integrity check.

In order for the information signal to be processed unchanged after anintegrity check when there has been no manipulation, the informationsignal processed by the means 101 for extracting is, for example, a copyof the information signal generated at first by the means 101 forextracting. Thus, the further information signal components may bemasked out or suppressed by the means 101 for extracting such that onlythe information signal components having the characteristic informationmay pass, without destroying the information signal itself.

According to another aspect of the present invention, the means 101 forextracting is configured to detect the information signal component inthe information signal and to extract a copy of the information signalcomponent in order to obtain the information signal component.

As has already been mentioned, the information signal may include afurther information signal component. The further information signalcomponent includes, for example, main information, such as, for example,useful data. The characteristic information may, for example, be sideinformation linked to the main information, wherein the side informationis contained in the information signal component which is to beextracted by the means 101.

According to one aspect of the present invention, the information signalcomponent and the further information signal component may be disposedin different portions of the information signal. When the informationsignal is, for example, present in the form of a data frame, theinformation signal component may, for example, be arranged at adifferent position of the data frame than the further information signalcomponent. Put differently, the two components are spaced apart fromeach other within the information signal. In this case, the means 101for extracting is configured to extract the portion of the informationsignal where the information signal component is arranged.

If, however, a spectrum of the information signal component hasdifferent spectral values than a spectrum of the further informationsignal component, the means 101 for extracting may be configured tofilter out the spectral values of the information signal component toobtain the information signal component. The spectral values of thefurther information signal component may, for example, be suppressed.Here, the means 101 for extracting may include a filter or be configuredas a filter itself in order to extract the spectral values linked to theinformation signal component. Additionally, the means 101 for extractingmay be configured to form a spectral analysis in order to filter out thespectral values of the spectrum of the information signal component. Forthis, the means 101 for extracting for example includes a Fouriertransformer configured to form a Fourier transform of the informationsignal, to set the spectral values of the further information signalcomponent in the Fourier transform to zero, and to transform the resultagain to the time domain to obtain the information signal component.

It is to be pointed out here that filtering should be performed bothwhen the information signal component and the further information signalcomponent are superimposed onto each other, and also when theinformation signal component and the further information signalcomponent are spaced apart from each other and are disposed in differentspectral domains.

When the information signal is, for example, an audio signal, such as,for example an MPEG signal, the further information signal component, asmain information, may include audio-spectral values which are, forexample, coded, wherein the scaling parameters associated to theaudio-spectral values are included as side information (characteristicinformation) from the information signal component.

The side information may, however, also be information on a number ofthe audio-spectral values, i.e. information regarding the distributionof the block length (block switching information), providing adistribution between short blocks and long blocks.

When the information signal is a video signal, the further informationsignal component may include video information as main information,wherein the information signal component exemplarily includes luminancevalues for the video information as further information.

The information signal component is made available to the means 103 forencrypting to obtain an encrypted signal by encrypting the informationsignal component using cryptographic methods. The means 103 forencrypting may, for example, be configured to form a hash value on theinformation signal component to obtain the encrypted signal. The means103 for encrypting may further be configured to form a check sum on theinformation signal component.

According to another aspect, the means 103 for encrypting may beconfigured to encrypt the information signal component using, forexample, the RSA algorithm using a private or public key. The means 103for encrypting may, however, be configured to use any other well-knownnon-symmetrical or symmetrical encrypting method to obtain the encryptedsignal.

Inventively, the encrypted signal is compared to a reference signal. Thereference signal may, for example, be included by the informationsignal. In this case, the means 101 for extracting is further configuredto extract the reference signal from the information signal. If thereference signal is disposed at a certain position of the informationsignal, the corresponding portion of the information signal includingthe reference signal will be extracted. The reference signal may,however, include a spectrum having specific reference spectral values sothat the means 101 for extracting, in analogy to the discussion above,can filter out the reference spectral values to extract the referencesignal.

If the reference signal is not contained in the information signal, themeans for extracting may be configured to select a reference signalassociated to the information signal component from a plurality ofreference signals. The reference signals may, for example, be stored ina memory for any conceivable information signal component such that,using the extracted information signal component including thecharacteristic information, a reference signal which is, for example,bound to the characteristic information and is thus linked thereto isselected.

The reference signal may be a hash value of a check sum on anon-manipulated information signal component. In general, theinformation signal may be a result of a cryptographic encryption of anon-manipulated reference signal component, wherein the cryptographicmethod mentioned above is, for example, used here.

The non-manipulated reference signal component is, for example,identical to the original information signal component. In analogy, thereference signal may be identical to the original, i.e. non-manipulatedinformation signal.

The above embodiments refer to the case that the information signalcomponent is encrypted to check the data integrity. It is, however, alsoconceivable according to the invention that the information signalcomponent which is characteristic for the information signal is comparedto a decrypted signal to check the information signal for integrity, thedecrypted signal resulting from a cryptographic decryption of areference signal.

According to another aspect, the invention provides a device fordetecting a manipulation of an information signal having means forextracting an information signal component characteristic for theinformation signal from the information signal, wherein the means forextracting may be identical to the means 101 for extracting alreadydescribed.

Additionally, the device includes means for decrypting a referencesignal, wherein the reference signal is an encrypted representation of anon-manipulated reference signal component of a reference informationsignal, to obtain a decrypted signal.

Additionally, the device includes means for comparing the decryptedsignal to the information signal component.

The reference signal which is, for example, included by the informationsignal and is also extracted by the means for extracting, is, forexample, an encrypted representation of the original information signalcomponent of an original information signal.

If the information signal is, for example, a digital signature,generated using a private key, on the information signal component, themeans for decrypting may be configured to decrypt the signature by apublic key linked to a private key, in order to obtain the decryptedsignal.

According to another aspect, the reference signal may be a signal whichhas been encrypted using any symmetrical or non-symmetrical encryptingmethod, wherein in the case of a non-symmetrical method, a private keyhas been used. The reference signal may then be decrypted at thereception side by a public key to obtain a decrypted version of theinformation signal component. After comparing the information signalcomponent received to the decrypted version, it may be determinedwhether there has been a manipulation of the information signal.

According to another aspect, the present invention provides a device forgenerating an information signal from an input signal, the input signalincluding an input signal component and a further input signalcomponent, wherein the further input signal component includes maininformation and the input signal component includes side informationlinked to the main information. The input signal component for examplecorresponds to the information signal component already mentioned andthe further input signal component for example corresponds to thefurther information signal component.

The device for generating the information signal includes means forencrypting the input signal component to obtain a reference signal.Additionally, the device for generating includes means for assemblingthe reception signal component, the further reception signal componentand the reference signal to generate the information signal.

According to one aspect of the present invention, the means forencrypting is configured to encrypt the input signal component which,for example, includes the information characteristic for the informationsignal or for the information signal type, using a cryptographicprocess, as has, for example, been mentioned above. The means forencrypting may exemplarily be configured to encrypt the input signalcomponent using a non-symmetrical encrypting process using a privatekey, wherein the reference signal, as has been described above, may, forexample, be decrypted using the public key.

The means for encrypting may, however, also be configured to form a hashvalue or a check sum on the input signal component to obtain thereference signal.

The means for assembling may exemplarily be configured to attach thereference signal to the input signal to generate the information signal.The means for assembling may, however, be configured to superimpose thereference signal for example onto the input signal, wherein thereference signal and the input signal may comprise different spectraldomains. The means for assembling may, however, also be configured todispose the reference signal at any position of the input signal.

It is possible according to the invention to check the integrity of thecharacteristic information of a dataset. If changes in thenon-characteristic information of a dataset are performed, the integritytest will still supply the statement identical. Thus, the maininformation mentioned above may exemplarily be processed withoutchanging the information signal component or input signal component.Watermarks may exemplarily be added to the further information signalcomponent or the further input signal component without influencing theintegrity of the data.

As has been described above, the characteristic information for thedesired case of application is extracted in a first step, for exampleusing a filter. In MP3-coded signals, this filter may, for example, maskout all Hoffmann code values (spectral lines, spectral values), i.e. letother bits pass. Filters of most different kinds are conceivable,including those masking out simple parts and performing complicatedfilter operations. Thus, only text not being formatted may, for example,be filtered out in a text document. In the case of a picture, only theluminance, and no color, is, for example, extracted, etc.

In another step, the characteristic information obtained (the output ofthe filter) is processed/tested by a conventional cryptographic method,such as, for example, by a cryptographic hash process.

If the information signal or input signal is an MP3-coded signal, itwill be decoded until the region where scaling factors are stored asside information can be established. The hash algorithm will then beapplied to the scaling factors of the dataset and the resulting hashvalue is stored as a reference, wherein the spectral values remainunconsidered.

Then, a watermark may be added to the signal as often as desired bymeans of a suitable bitstream watermarking process. For testing whetherthe characteristic information has changed, the region of the scalingfactors (scaling parameters) is determined again (information signalcomponent), the hash on the scaling factors is calculated and comparedto the reference, as has been described above. If the characteristicinformation is unchanged, the hash will be the same.

Other possibilities of defining characteristic information for MP3-codedsignals are, for example, the complete side information, a certain partof the spectral values, in case watermarking is only used for thecomplementary part, or block-switching information (distribution shortblocks, long blocks) already mentioned.

The spectral values may exemplarily be scaled by scaling factors.Additionally, the spectral values may be coded, such as, for example, beHuffman-coded.

Thus, the present invention, among other things, provides a way ofproviding a watermark-compatible hash.

Apart from the devices described, the present invention also providesmethods having the corresponding functionality. In addition, all thefunctionalities of the different embodiments may be combined with oneanother to obtain further advantageous effects of the present invention.

Depending on the circumstances, the inventive method may be implementedin either hardware or software. The implementation may be on a digitalmemory medium, in particular on a disc or a CD having control signalswhich may be read out electronically, which may cooperate with aprogrammable computer system such that the corresponding method will beexecuted. In general, the invention thus also includes a computerprogram product having a program code stored on a machine-readablecarrier for performing at least one of the inventive methods when thecomputer program product runs on a computer. Put differently, theinvention may also be realized as a computer program having a programcode for performing the methods when the computer program runs on acomputer.

While this invention has been described in terms of several embodiments,there are alterations, permutations, and equivalents which fall withinthe scope of this invention. It should also be noted that there are manyalternative ways of implementing the methods and compositions of thepresent invention. It is therefore intended that the following appendedclaims be interpreted as including all such alterations, permutationsand equivalents as fall within the true spirit and scope of the presentinvention.

1. A device for detecting a manipulation of an information signal,wherein the information signal includes an information signal componentwith side information and a further information signal component withmain information, the side information being linked to the maininformation, implemented in hardware and comprising: an extractor forextracting the information signal component with side information andcharacteristic for the information signal from the information signal;an encryptor for encrypting the extracted information signal componentwith side information to acquire an encrypted signal; and a comparatorfor comparing the encrypted signal to a reference signal, the referencesignal being an encrypted representation of a non-manipulated referencesignal component with side information of a reference information signalto detect the manipulation, wherein the information signal is an audiosignal, and the extractor is configured to divide-up the audio signalinto audio-spectral values in conjunction with scaling parameters, andto assign all audio-spectral values to the further information signalcomponent as the main information, and all scaling parameters to theinformation signal component as the side information so that theencrypted signal is independent of the audio-spectral values, butdependent on all scaling parameters.
 2. The device according to claim 1,wherein the extractor is formed not to filter out the information signalcomponent with main information such that a change of the informationsignal component with main information is not detectable.
 3. The deviceaccording to claim 1, wherein the information signal component with sideinformation and the information signal component with main informationare arranged in different portions of the information signal, andwherein the extractor is formed to extract the portion of theinformation signal where the information signal component with sideinformation is disposed to acquire the extracted information signalcomponent.
 4. The device according to claim 1, wherein a spectrum of theinformation signal component and a spectrum of the further informationsignal component comprise different spectral values, and wherein theextractor is formed to filter out the spectral values of the informationsignal component to acquire the information signal component.
 5. Thedevice according to claim 1, wherein the information signal is a videosignal, wherein the further information signal component includes videoinformation as main information, and wherein the information signalcomponent includes luminance values for the video information as sideinformation.
 6. The device according to claim 1, wherein the encryptoris formed to form a hash value or a check sum on the information signalcomponent to acquire the encrypted signal.
 7. The device according toclaim 1, wherein the information signal further includes the referencesignal, wherein the extractor is formed to extract the reference signalfrom the information signal.
 8. The device according to claim 7, whereinthe extractor is formed to select a reference signal associated to theinformation signal component from a plurality of reference signals. 9.The device according to claim 7, wherein the reference signal is a hashvalue or a check sum on the non-manipulated reference signal component.10. The device according to claim 1, wherein the non-manipulatedreference signal component is identical to the original informationsignal component, and wherein the reference signal is identical to theoriginal information signal.
 11. A device for detecting a manipulationof an information signal, implemented in hardware and comprising: anextractor for extracting an information signal component characteristicfor the information signal from the information signal; a decryptor fordecrypting a reference signal, the reference signal being an encryptedrepresentation of a non-manipulated reference signal component of areference information signal to acquire a decrypted signal; and acomparator for comparing the decrypted signal to the information signalcomponent to detect the manipulation of the information signal, whereinthe information signal is an audio signal, and the extractor isconfigured to divide-up the audio signal into audio-spectral values inconjunction with scaling parameters, and to assign all audio-spectralvalues to the further information signal component as the maininformation, and all scaling parameters to the information signalcomponent as the side information so that the decrypted signal isindependent of the audio-spectral values, but dependent on all scalingparameters.
 12. The device according to claim 11, wherein the referencesignal is a digital signature, generated using a private key, on theinformation signal component, and wherein the decryptor is formed todecrypt the signature by a public key linked to the private key toacquire the decrypted signal.
 13. A device for generating an informationsignal from an input signal, the input signal including an input signalcomponent and a further input signal component, the further input signalcomponent including main information, and the input signal componentincluding side information linked to the main information, implementedin hardware and the device including: an encryptor for encrypting theinput signal component to acquire a reference signal; and an assemblerfor assembling the input signal component, the further input signalcomponent and the reference signal to generate the information signal,so as to enable a comparator of a receiving/detecting device forcomparing the encrypted signal to the reference signal, the referencesignal being an encrypted representation of a non-manipulated referencesignal component with side information of the reference informationsignal to detect the manipulation, wherein the information signal is anaudio signal, and the device is configured to divide-up the audio signalinto audio-spectral values in conjunction with scaling parameters, andto assign all audio- spectral values to the further information signalcomponent as the main information, and all scaling parameters to theinformation signal component as the side information so that thereference signal is independent of the audio-spectral values, butdependent on all scaling parameters.
 14. The device according to claim13, wherein the encryptor is formed to form a hash value or a check sumon the input signal component to acquire the reference signal.
 15. Thedevice according to claim 13, wherein the assembler is formed to attachthe reference signal to the input signal to generate the informationsignal.
 16. A method for detecting a manipulation of an informationsignal, wherein the information signal includes an information signalcomponent with side information and a further information signalcomponent with main information, the side information being linked tothe main information, configuring at least one processor to perform thefunction of extracting the information signal component with sideinformation and characteristic for the information signal from theinformation signal; encrypting the extracted information signalcomponent with side information to acquire an encrypted signal; andcomparing the encrypted signal to a reference signal, the referencesignal being an encrypted representation of a non-manipulated referencesignal component with side information of a reference information signalto detect the manipulation, wherein the information signal is an audiosignal, and the extracting comprises dividing-up the audio signal intoaudio-spectral values in conjunction with scaling parameters, andassigning all audio-spectral values to the further information signalcomponent as the main information, and all scaling parameters to theinformation signal component as the side information so that theencrypted signal is independent of the audio-spectral values, butdependent on all scaling parameters.
 17. A method for detecting amanipulation of an information signal, configuring at least oneprocessor to perform the function of extracting an information signalcomponent characteristic for the information signal from the informationsignal; decrypting a reference signal, the reference signal being anencrypted representation of a non-manipulated reference signal componentof a reference information signal to acquire a decrypted signal; andcomparing the decrypted signal to the information signal component todetect the manipulation, wherein the information signal is an audiosignal, and the extracting comprises dividing-up the audio signal intoaudio-spectral values in conjunction with scaling parameters, andassigning all audio-spectral values to the further information signalcomponent as the main information, and all scaling parameters to theinformation signal component as the side information so that thedecrypted signal is independent of the audio-spectral values, butdependent on all scaling parameters.
 18. A method for generating aninformation signal from an input signal, the input signal including aninput signal component and a further input signal component, the furtherinput signal component including main information, and the input signalcomponent including side information linked to the main information, theinformation signal is an audio signal, configuring at least oneprocessor to perform the function of: dividing-up the audio signal intoaudio-spectral values in conjunction with scaling parameters, andassigning all audio-spectral values to the further information signalcomponent as the main information, and all scaling parameters to theinformation signal component as the side information; encrypting theinput signal component to acquire a reference signal; and assembling theinput signal component, the further input signal component and thereference signal to generate the information signal so that thereference signal is independent of the audio-spectral values, butdependent on all scaling parameters. wherein enabling a comparator of areceiving/detecting device for comparing the Encrypted signal to thereference signal,the reference signal being an encrypted representationof a non-manipulated reference signal component with side information ofthe reference information signal to detect the manipulation. 19.Non-transitory computer-readable medium having stored thereon a computerprogram for performing, when the computer program runs on a computer, amethod for detecting a manipulation of an information signal, whereinthe information signal includes an information signal component withside information and a further information signal component with maininformation, the side information being linked to the main information,the method comprising: extracting the information signal component withside information and characteristic for the information signal from theinformation signal; encrypting the extracted information signalcomponent with side information to acquire an encrypted signal; andcomparing the encrypted signal to a reference signal, the referencesignal being an encrypted representation of a non-manipulated referencesignal component with side information of a reference information signalto detect the manipulation, wherein the information signal is an audiosignal, and the extractor is configured to divide-up the audio signalinto audio-spectral values in conjunction with scaling parameters , andto assign all audio-spectral values to the further information signalcomponent as the main information, and all scaling parameters to theinformation signal component as the side information so that theencrypted signal is independent of the audio-spectral values, butdependent on all scaling parameters.
 20. Non-transitorycomputer-readable medium having stored thereon a computer program forperforming, when the computer program runs on a computer, a method fordetecting a manipulation of an information signal, the methodcomprising: extracting an information signal component characteristicfor the information signal from the information signal; decrypting areference signal, the reference signal being an encrypted representationof a non-manipulated reference signal component of a referenceinformation signal to acquire a decrypted signal; and comparing thedecrypted signal to the information signal component to detect themanipulation, wherein the information signal is an audio signal, and theextractor is configured to divide-up the audio signal intoaudio-spectral values scaling parameters, and to assign allaudio-spectral values to the further information signal component as themain information, and all scaling parameters to the information signalcomponent as the side information.
 21. Non-transitory computer-readablemedium having stored thereon a computer program for performing, when thecomputer program runs on a computer, a method for generating aninformation signal from an input signal, the input signal including aninput signal component and a further input signal component, the furtherinput signal component including main information, and the input signalcomponent including side information linked to the main information, themethod comprising: encrypting the input signal component to acquire areference signal; and assembling the input signal component, the furtherinput signal component and the reference signal to generate theinformation signal, so as to enable a comparator of a receiving/detecting device for comparing the encrypted signal to the referencesignal, the reference signal being an encrypted representation of anon-manipulated reference signal component with side information of thereference information signal to detect the manipulation, wherein theinformation signal is an audio signal, and the extractor is configuredto divide-up the audio signal into audio-spectral values, in conjunctionwith scaling parameters, and to assign all audio-spectral values to thefurther information signal component as the main information, and allscaling parameters to the information signal component as the sideinformation so that the encrypted signal is independent of theaudio-spectral values, but dependent on all scaling parameters.